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Conflicting Views on Fair Siting Processes:
Evidence from Austria and the U.S.*
Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Kevin B. Fitzgerald**
Introduction
The impasse in siting hazardous waste facilities is a policy problem
of major significance throughout the industrialized world. No country
can claim full success in the design of procedures for siting hazardous
waste and other noxious facilities that promote social cohesion, trust
and a sense of fair process and outcome.' This failure to allocate the
costs and risks of needed waste facilities stands in marked contrast to
other commonplace social burdens, such as jury duty, military service
and even taxes, for which societies have institutions and procedures that
are for the most part accepted as fair, or fair enough.2
The most recent and notable trend for siting locally unwanted
facilities is away from hierarchical siting procedures, where the state or
national government exercises the power of eminent domain, to
voluntary siting procedures that give local residents the power of
consent in the siting decision through referenda and other community
choice mechanisms. By transferring property rights from the
government to the local community, this voluntary approach empowers
residents to bargain with developers to arrive at a mutually beneficial
siting contract. Many view this as the logical and fair way out of the
* Dr. Linnerooth-Bayer is leader of the Risk, Policy and Complexity Project,
IIASA (Laxenburg, Austria). She studied industrial engineering and management at
Carnegie-Mellon University and received her Ph.D. (Economics) from the University
of Maryland.
Mr. Fitzgerald is a doctoral candidate at the Wharton School of Business,
University of Pennsylvania and has extensive experience in energy efficiency and
applied economics.
1 Howard Kunreuther, Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Kevin Fitzgerald, Siting
Hazardous Facilities: Lessons from Europe and America, in Energy Environment and
the Economy- Asian Perspectives (P. Kleindorfer, H. Kunreuther & D. Hong, eds.
1996).
2 Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary
Burdens (1992); and H. Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (1994).
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siting dilemma, and they are frustrated and confused by the opposition
voluntary approaches receive in practice.
The optimism and subsequent frustration with voluntary siting
approaches stems from an incomplete conceptual framework of siting
controversies, particularly their characterization as "not in my back
yard" (NIMBY) problems. According to this characterization, concerns
about the risks and benefits of a facility singularly determine political
views and action. This means that the way out of the siting impasse,
besides assuring that a facility is viewed as adequately safe, lies in
voluntary approaches that give residents the right to bargain for more
benefits in the form of compensation and community control.
The pitfall of this approach is that the citizens of the potential host
communities, and the public more generally, are not concerned only
about their risks and benefits, but also about procedures and outcomes
for sharing a siting burden that they view as trustworthy and fair.
Although some see the fair solution as one which fully compensates the
neighbors, others view this market solution as an unfair strategy to place
facilities in poor communities. Our main point is that what is viewed as
fair differs among the population, and fairness cannot always be assured
by an allocation where everyone enjoys more perceived benefits than
costs. Renn et al.3 suggest that the siting process should be one of
norm generation or the creation of communitarian values and social
preferences that transcend egoistic perspectives. We emphasize,
however, the difficulties in generating commonly held norms. People
hold strongly conflicting ideas of what constitutes a fair and
trustworthy process and outcome, and, we suggest, these competing
views about fairness are at the core of the siting impasse. Only by
granting legitimacy to these different views will it be possible to
construct a siting process that, by compromising but not abandoning
the contending notions of fairness, commands general support.
Our explanation, therefore, for the disappointing record of
voluntary siting approaches is that they are not considered legitimate
and fair by many of the key actors. While bargaining a mutually
beneficial deal is attractive to some, this individualistic notion of fair
process and outcome is rejected by those who prefer more authoritative
3 Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler & Hans Kastenholz, Procedural & Substantive
Fairness in Landfill Siting: A Swiss Case Study 7 Risk 145 (1996).
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and expert-dominated siting procedures as well as by those who view
bargaining processes as a means of exploiting the poor and
disadvantaged. Moreover, market mechanisms may crowd out other
motivations for community members to accept a facility, especially the
sense of responsibility or social duty they may feel towards dealing with
hazardous waste.4 Views on fairness are thus closely related to ideas
of community, social consent and social organization. 5
In this paper, we demonstrate the plural notions of fair process and
outcome for siting hazardous waste facilities by examining experience
in Austria, which has a traditionally hierarchical political culture, and
comparing Austrian experience with the more individualistic political
culture in the U.S. We also report on an Austrian questionnaire that
shows that even within a dominantly hierarchical society, other views of
fairness co-exist and compete. Finally, we suggest some possible
elements of a robust siting policy that, by appealing to different ideas
of fairness, can be accepted as "fair enough" by most or all of the
antagonistic actors in a siting controversy.
Competing Views of Fairness for Sharing the Siting Burden
Views on fairness cannot be separated from ideas about community
and social organization, or the need to establish shared values for the
conduct of community procedures and the distribution of rights, goods
and burdens. 6 Two well-documented forms of social organization
that coexist, as well as compete, are hierarchy and market 7 . Hierarchy
is characterized by positional authority, inequality, and procedural
4 Rolf Lidskog & Ingemar Elander, Reinterpreting Locational Conflicts: NIMBY
and Nuclear Waste Management in Sweden, 20 Policy & Politics 249 (1992); Ray
Kemp, Why not in My Backyard? A Radical Interpretation of Public Opposition to
the Deep Disposal of Radioactive Waste in the United Kingdom, 22 Env. &
Planningr 1239 (1990); Bruno S. Frey, Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Reiner Eichenberge,
The OD Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets, Presented at
the 1995 University of Chicago, Application of Economics Workshop; and Doug
Easterling, Fair Rules for Siting a High Level Nuclear Waste Repository, 11 J. Policy
Anal. Management 442 (1992).
5 Steve Rayner, A Conceptual Map of Human Values for Climate Change
Decision Making, Presented at 1994 Workshop on Equity an Social Considerations,
IPCC Working Group III, Nairobi, Kenya.
6 Id.
7 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (1977); Oliver E. Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies(1975); and Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis & Aaron
Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (1990).
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rationality and, therefore, stands in sharp contrast to market forms of
social organization with their emphasis on personal rights and freedoms.
In hierarchies, people accept their rank and station (and inequality), as
well as tightly administered rules and procedures, for the harmonious
functioning and overall welfare of the society in which they live.
Fairness and distributive issues are settled by administrative
determination based on such considerations as the rank of the
recipients, their needs or their contributions. 8 The individualistic
form of social solidarity, by contrast, enshrines individual rights and
initiative, negotiation and competition.9 Once the initial endowments
of individuals are set, distributive issues are settled by market
interactions. Of course, no country's or state's siting procedures can be
characterized as singularly hierarchical or individualistic. Most combine
governmental and expert authority with participatory mechanisms that
empower communities, formally or informally, to negotiate or bargain
for a siting contract of some sort. However, viewing these procedures as
embedded in and negotiated between hierarchical and individualistic
political cultures is helpful in explaining the contradictory notions of
fair process and outcome that are observed in siting controversies. We
suggest that these two contradictory notions of fair outcome and
process (hierarchical and individualistic), together with a third notion of
fairness that we will come to presently, characterize and even help
explain the siting impasse most countries face.
A Hierarchical View ofFair Siting
With authority located firmly with government officials and their
expert networks, and with strict bureaucratic procedures in place, the
Austrian siting process is predominantly hierarchical. Recently, two
Austrian towns, Blumau and Enzersdorf, were identified by a secretive
expert process as candidates for two hazardous waste facilities. In a
departure from legal procedures, the citizens of these communities were
involved in the approval process, but only on the condition that if the
sites were found to be technically qualified, the citizens would raise no
further objections. The authorities explicitly stated that the
characteristics of the people and village - that Blumau is a poor,
8 Rayner, supra note 5.
9 Thompson et al., supra note 7.
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farming community and that Enzersdorf is already burdened by other
industrial risks - would not be factors in the site approval process.
10
It must be pointed out that this technical, minimal-risk criterion
need not be, indeed is often not, the sole criterion characterizing
hierarchical siting processes, which often adopt benevolent, even
patronizing, policies toward the public welfare.1 1 Yet these policies
must be justifiable and serve to maintain the control of the authorities.
In this case, relenting to arguments of vulnerability on the part of the
Blumauians and Enzersdorfians would have undermined the intent of
the authorities to site facilities in these towns (since they had not
admitted any alternatives). Choosing only ,technically qualified sites,
with government authorities and their expert networks firmly in
control, was a justifiable position for the Austrian authorities and
consistent with the utilitarian tradition set out in the Austrian
constitution. 12 Also in this tradition, the citizens of Blumau and
Enzersdorf accepted the conditions for public involvement, and
therefore showed a willingness to sacrifice their right of consent and to
defer to public and expert authority.
Austria is not the only country with predominantly hierarchical
procedures in place for siting socially necessary, but locally undesirable,
facilities. Most European countries and U.S. states have traditionally
relied on governmental authority to impose locally unwanted
developments. 13 This orthodox approach has been successful in the
case of Enzersdorf but has failed disastrously in the community of
Blumau where it has been met by adamant social resistance. Similarly in
the U.S., officials have unsuccessfully searched for a site for permanent
storage of high level nuclear wastes for over twenty years. With growing
protest over Yucca Mountain in Nevada, regulators are now considering
more market-oriented approaches and encouraging communities to
negotiate with the proposers for a facility site.
14
10 Joanne Linnerooth & Benjamin Davy, Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Facility
Siting in Central Europe: The Austrian Case, Report to Bundesministerium ffir
Wissenschaft und Forschung (1994).
11 We owe this point to Thomas Schelling; personal communication, Aug. 1995.
12 Linnerooth and Davy, supra note 10.
13 Roger E. Kasperson, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Community, Firm, and
Governmental Perspectives, in National Academy of Engineering, Hazards:
Technology and Fairness (1986); and Kunreuther et al., supra note 1.
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An Individualistic View ofFair Siting
Particularly in the U.S., the idea of governmental institutions and
their expert networks determining sites to promote the social good
tends to be viewed as an overly authoritarian approach based on a
flawed calculation of the public's aversion to hosting these types of
facilities. 15 At the least, the approach requires a strong public trust in
government and expert judgment, which simply does not exist in the
U.S. and is waning in most European countries. 16 Moreover, ample
evidence indicates that expert measures of risk only loosely correlate
with people's concerns about hazardous technologies. 17
Some have sought to explain the dearth of hierarchical siting
procedures in many U.S. states by invoking the NIMBY thesis. 1 8
Accordingly, top-down siting decisions are politically stalemated by
social resistance because the concentrated costs felt by host
communities create greater incentives to oppose a facility than the
diffuse benefits give the larger population to support. The NIMBY
thesis suggests that narrowly defined local and national interests, driven
by perceptions of risks and benefits are the main explanatory factors of
the siting impasse, an explanation which tacitly rules out any altruistic
motivation on the part of individual citizens to sacrifice their personal
benefits for greater societal interest and cannot cope with the now
widespread phenomenon of people opposing facilities that are far from
their backyards. Taking the individualistic view, the solution lies in
14 Doug Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository (1994).
15 Kasperson, supra note 13; Robert Cameron Mitchell & Richard T. Carson,
Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AEA
Papers & Proc. 285 (1986); and Howard Kunreuther, Paul Slovic & Donald
MacGregor, Risk Perception and Trust: Challenges for Facility Siting 7 Risk 109
(1996).
16 Roger E. Kasperson, Dominic Golding & Seth Tuler, Siting Hazardous
Facilities and Communicating Risks under Conditions of High Social Distrust,
submitted toJ. Soc. Issues (1992).
17 Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, 236 Science 290 (1987); and Aaron Wildavsky &
Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why? 119 Daedulus
41(1991).
18 Michael O'Hare, Not on My Block You Don't: Facility Siting and the Strategic
Importance of Compensation, 25 Public Policy 409 (1977); and Kent E Portney,
The Potential of the Theory of Compensation for Mitigating Public Opposition to
Hazardous Waste Treatment Facility Siting: Some Evidence from Five
Massachusetts Communities, 14 Policy Studies J. 81 (1985).
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changing the balance between perceived local risks and benefits, not by
administrative determination, but by granting citizens of prospective
host communities the right to negotiate to their advantage. In other
words, by actively influencing the design and control of the facility, as
well as by negotiating lucrative benefit packages, supporters of this
approach argue that residents, by collective consent mechanisms such as
referenda, will voluntarily enter into siting contracts.
19
In contrast to hierarchical siting approaches that are characterized
by positional authority and appeals to utilitarian ideals, this
individualistic form of social solidarity can be characterized by
competition, bargaining and initiative based upon individual rights and
community consent. 20 Advocates of the voluntary, market approach
point to its guarantee of a Pareto improvement, i.e., one in which the
siting decision (with compensation) is preferred over the status quo by
all concerned. 2 1 To ensure that communities arrive at a compensation
package that reflects the "reservation price" of the collective preferences
of the residents (however defined), analysts have proposed bidding and
auction mechanisms that assure a fair compensation price. 22 Because
vocal opposition groups, which may represent only a small fraction of
the community, often derail the process, advocates of this approach
suggest that the negotiations be combined with direct citizen approval,
preferably through a referendum. 2 3
Voluntary, market forms of siting appeal to individualistic ideals of
citizen rights and freedoms to negotiate mutually beneficial deals. If all
19 Bradley Whitehead, Who Gave You the Right? Property Rights and the
Potential for Locally Binding Referenda in the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities
unpublished (1991); Howard Kunreuther, Kevin Fitzgerald & Thomas D. Aarts,
Siting Noxious Facilities: A Test of the Facility Siting Credo, 13 Risk Anal.
301(1993); andMichael B. Gerrard, Whose Backyard, Whose Risk. Fear and Fairness
in Toxic and Nudear Waste Siting (1994).
20 Thompson et al., supra note 7.
21 Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow & Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting and Public
Opposition (1983); Howard Kunreuther et al., A Compensation Mechanism for
Siting Noxious Facilities: Theory and Experimental Design, 14 J Env'l Econ. &
Management 371 (1987); and David Laws & Lawrence Susskind, Changing
Perspectives on the Facility Siting Process, Draft Paper (1991).
22 Howard Kunreuther & Paul Portney, Wheel of Fortune: A Lottery/Auction
Mechanism for Siting of Noxious Facilities, 117 J. Energy Engineer. 125 (1991).
23 Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Voluntary Siting of Noxious Facilities:
Comment, Presented at the 1993 IIASA Risk and Fairness Workshop; Whitehead,
supra note 19; and Gerrard supra note 19.
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the residents feel better off as a result of the transactions, the outcome
is Pareto superior to not siting the facility. Since it is inconceivable to
proponents of this approach that a Pareto improvement - where all
concerned feel themselves to be better off - is not viewed as a fair
outcome, it is worth noting that the concept of Pareto welfare has come
under increasing critical scrutiny.24 Although a discussion of this
critique is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to recognize
the underlying individualistic ethic of welfare theory. Individual choice,
whether or not it satisfies any particular social goal not held by the
individuals making the choices, determines the social good.
The market approach to siting noxious facilities has had little
success. Beginning with the 1980 Massachusetts Hazardous Waste
Facility Siting Act, many U.S. states have legislated various forms of
voluntary consent with negotiated compensation for siting hazardous
waste and other locally undesirable facilities, most recently for siting a
low level radioactive waste repository in Maine. 2 5 With few
exceptions, these approaches have failed to reach agreement on
compensating the host community. 2 6 Proponents offer a number of
explanations, including flawed communication, badly designed
mechanisms of consent and the failure to consider neighboring
communities. 2 7 They point to experience with many non-hazardous,
solid waste facilities where host fees have been instrumental in siting.28
Despite discouraging practical experience, a negotiated outcome
where all parties view themselves as better off than the status quo, and a
market bargaining procedure that upholds individual rights, is the
24 Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, Philosophy & Pub. Affairs Summer 1977, at 4; and Young,
supra note 2.
25 Laws & Susskind, supra note 21.
26 Kunreuther and Portney, supra note 22; Easterling, supra note 4; J. T.
Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND J. Econ. 101 (1993); James J. Opaluch et al.,
Evaluating Impacts from Noxious Facilities: Including Public Preferences in Current
Siting Mechanisms, 24 J. Env'1 Econ. & Management 41 (1993); and Anna Vari,
Public Perceptions about Equity and Fairness: Siting Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities in the United States and Hungary, Presented at the 1993 HASA
Risk and Fairness Workshop.
27 Gerrard, supra note 19.
28 Economics of Trash: Some Towns Get Little for Agreeing to Dumps, Wall
Street Journal, Dec. 3, 1991, at 1.
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individualistic view of a fair outcome and process for siting hazardous
facilities. As the economist Coase theorized, market bargaining will
lead to a Pareto improved position no matter how the initial property
rights are distributed. 29 In the words of Whitehead, "It would appear
that a combination of local decision making authority and negotiated
compensation would produce the 'Coasean ideal' and siting would no
longer be an issue." 30
An Egalitarian View ofFair Siting
Yet, siting remains an issue, and, we contend, for more fundamental
reasons than flawed design of the consent procedures. A recent example
concerning the Paiute-Shoshone Native American Tribe in Oregon
illustrates the moral indignation that the market approach often
invokes. The Paiute-Shoshone's agreement to negotiate terms,
presumably compensation in terms of money and jobs, for storing spent
nuclear fuel on their reservation was met with the following:31
Any decision to store high-level nuclear waste anywhere,
even temporarily, ought to be based on sound science, not
bribery or cynical manipulation of the jobless.poor. Social
welfare it is not.... Just because there are two willing partners
to do this tango is no reason to hold the dance.
Since the poor are willing to accept less compensation, critics claim that
the burden inevitably and unjustly lands on minority and vulnerable
communities. 3 2 For this reason, advocates of environmental justice
uncompromisingly reject the market approach to siting locally
unwanted facilities as unfair, even morally wrong.
Possibly no other issue better illustrates our theme of competing
forms of social organization and the resultant incompatible views of
fairness. Market advocates argue that if the site is proved to be
technically qualified (though not technically best) and if the Paiute-
Shoshones have full authority to make the final decision, then a
compensated deal can be viewed as fair and legitimate. 3 3 The
29 Ronald A. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
30 Whitehead, supra note 19, at14.
31 Reject Nuclear Bribery, The Sunday Oregonian, Mar. 6, 1994, at 11.
32 Robert D. Bullard, Waste and Racism: A Stacked Deck? Forum Appl. Research
& Pub. Policy, Spring 1993, at 29.
33 Lawrence S. Bacow, Waste and Fairness: No Easy Answers, Forum Appl.
Research & Pub. Policy, Spring 1993, at 43.
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alternative, forcing the wastes on an affluent community, is paternalistic
and "Pareto pessimal" in that both communities would then feel
themselves worse off than had the Paiute-Shoshones taken the waste,
jobs, and money. Neither the market nor hierarchical approaches are
universally rejected; indeed, each has (albeit in different proportions
and patterns of interaction in different countries) strong supporters.
According to cultural theorists, their critics would likely be those - the
egalitarians - whose solidarity exists within a third mode of social
organization. 34 Egalitarians, as their name suggests, reject both the
unequal social relations of hierarchy and the competitive outcomes of
markets. Their rationality is more critical, and generally they reject
siting efforts for hazardous waste facilities on the strongly held moral
basis that the wastes necessitating the facilities should not be produced
in the first place.3 5 Egalitarian solidarity is strengthened by appeals to
a shared morality, and it is their moral imperative to reject siting
procedures that perpetuate social inequality.
The voluntary trade of health and safety risks from an unequal
starting position or reference point, even if it improves the health and
safety of those making the bargain (as market advocates argue), is
therefore illegitimate to the egalitarian. Not only is the assumption that
the poor and uneducated can negotiate an improvement in their
situation suspect, but a greater improvement in social welfare is possible
by placing facilities in affluent communities since this compensates for
past injustices and will do more towards eliminating the unjust
economic activities that have created the need for the facilities in the
first place. As such, the siting of hazardous waste facilities in poor areas,
even with compensation, is viewed as an exploitation of those in poverty
and not as a means of improving their economic condition. Moreover,
the marketing of health and safety transgresses the legitimate realm of
markets, and can be compared with the social aversion to the marketing
and sale of, for example, kidneys, or even children. 36
The important distinguishing feature of the egalitarian is that a
situation with an increased overall burden may be accepted if the
burden is distributed more equally among the population. A form of
34 Thompson et al., supra note 7.
35 Michael Thompson, Unsiteability: What Should It Tell Us? 7 Risk 169.
36 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); and Elster, supra note 2, at 224.
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egalitarianism is the victim-based view, which supports the notion that
the worst-off people or worst-off communities have a legitimate moral
complaint to make about their situation, and that their situation
deserves special attention. 37 Accordingly, Enzersdorf has a special
claim for exemption because its citizens are already heavily burdened;
Blumau also has a special claim based on citizen poverty. Hierarchical
forces in Austria, however, rejected these egalitarian concerns that the
characteristics of the host community, including income, education and
health status be regarded as moral factors in site selection.3 8
Austrian Views on Fair Siting Procedures and Outcomes
Thus far, we have characterized Austrian siting processes as
predominantly hierarchical, whereas we have noted that individualism
plays a more prominent role in many U.S. siting procedures (and that
both approaches are rejected by egalitarians as unfair). While these
characterizations hold, cultural theorists suggest that the variations in
political attitudes and values within countries are at least as great as
those between countries. 39 If this is the case, then we can expect large
variations in views about fair siting procedures and outcomes within
both Austria and the U.S.
To examine the cultural plurality of public views on siting
hazardous waste facilities, we administered a questionnaire to 111
residents of Lower Austria. The intent of the questionnaire was to elicit
Austrian views on the three culturally differentiated siting approaches:
hierarchical siting procedures, where expert studies constitute the main
criteria for site selection and approval (the current Austrian approach);
voluntary processes with negotiated compensation; and, egalitarian
approaches placing emphasis on distributive equality. A written
questionnaire was given to fourteen residents of Blumau, 24 residents of
Enzersdorf, ten industry experts, and 63 citizens of Lower Austria. The
sample was representative of Lower Austria with respect to educational
background (5.7% with advanced degrees compared to 5% in Austria)
and sex (52% female compared with 51% in Austria) of respondents.
37 Douglas MacLean, Variations on Fairness, Presented at the 1993 IIASA Risk and
Fairness Workshop.
38 Linnerooth & Davy, supra note 10.
39 Thompson et al., supra note 7.
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The questionnaire focused on both outcome and procedural
fairness. Is it fair, for instance, to put a hazardous waste facility in an
industrial area, such as Enzersdorf, where residents are already heavily
burdened by industrial risks? Is it fair to choose a site in an
economically disadvantaged and environmentally pristine area, such as
Blumau, where citizens have benefitted little from industrialization of
the economy? If one site is technically superior, i.e., it minimizes
population and environmental risks, should other characteristics of the
community matter at all? Should the potential host community have
the right of refusal, and how should this be determined? Are lottery
and bidding mechanisms appropriate for allocating facilities among
technically qualified sites? Do regions and even countries have a
responsibility to deal with their own wastes, and not to export them?
These questions, which relate closely to the three cultural categories
identified as important in views on fair siting procedures and outcomes,
were explored in the Austrian questionnaire. The results are shown in
Table 1.
Table I
Austrian Views on Fair Siting Processes and Outcomes
Blumau Enzersdorf Industry Citizens Overall
[Values in %] Experts
Absolute Priority to
Lowest Risk Site 64 42 70 46 53(Let Experts Decide)Voluntay Siting 79 67 20 54 55
Use Market Mechanisms
(Bidding, compensation) 14 20 25 40 29Seek EqualityS Equal Chance Lottery 7 33 40 49 38
• Prefer Many Small
Facilities 21 50 11 27 30
Assign Responsibility
• Industry Should Deal
with Own Wastes 93 83 88 84 85
• Do Not Ship
Out of Country 79 80 100 89 85
Perhaps the most striking result of the questionnaire was public
support for its hierarchical siting procedures. When the respondents
were asked if they would disregard all features of the host communities
(whether they are already burdened by other industrial hazards,
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whether they are poor and vulnerable, whether they have benefitted
from industrial production etc.) if experts reported that the proposed
site was technically superior or posed the lowest overall risk to the
public, 53% of the respondents answered positively (and 70% of the
industrial experts). This shows a remarkable deference to expert
authority and an acceptance of Austrian hierarchical political
procedures, at least by many of the respondents. It also shows a concern
with assuring that the site is technically suitable, above and beyond
other social considerations.
Around half of those questioned (and 79% of the Blumauians) felt
that the prospective host community should, however, have the right to
refuse a site even if the site is technically qualified. This is not
necessarily inconsistent with the reported emphasis on giving priority to
the lowest risk site (and as seen on Table 1, some people responded
positively to both). Among those who advocated voluntary siting
procedures, there was almost unanimous agreement that this consent
should not be the prerogative of the major, but rather a citizens'
committee or referendum. This enthusiasm with voluntary siting
procedures did not, however, go hand in hand with an enthusiasm for
community bargaining or bidding for compensatory benefits, which
was rejected by nearly two-thirds of the respondents.
Support for voluntary siting procedures, but rejection of market
mechanisms, shows the fallacy of assuming that the two are
complementary components of what we call here the market approach.
Indeed, different forms of voluntary siting procedures can complement
hierarchical approaches by formalizing the often informal practice of
negotiating with the community, yet with the understanding that the
state has ultimate authority if an agreement is not reached.
Given Austria's entrenched hierarchical procedures, it is still
remarkable that 29% of the respondents, and 40% of the citizens not
living in Blumau or Enzersdorf, were in favor of market transactions
with respect to siting hazardous waste facilities. This suggests a
substantial, individualistic component of Austrian political life.
Egalitarian tendencies were also present. Around a third of the
respondents were in favor of choosing among qualified sites with an
equal-chance lottery, and again around a third would prefer building
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and distributing several smaller facilities than one large one, even if the
risks of this option were slightly higher (the Blumauians, however, were
far less egalitarian).
Perhaps the most significant finding of the questionnaire was the
importance placed on the concept of responsibility. The notion that
people producing wastes, whether an industry or a country, should be
primarily responsible for dealing with them, was a value held by 85% of
the respondents. This was demonstrated in the repondents' views that
the industry should deal with its own wastes as well as views that wastes
should not be exported. Taking local responsibility for wastes,
therefore, appears to be one important element of a robust siting
strategy that transcends the culturally differentiated views of fair
process and outcome.
The overall finding of this questionnaire is that the residents of
Lower Austria are far from homogeneous in their views towards siting
hazardous facilities. Many appear to support their traditional siting
structures with legitimacy rooted in technical expertise; others hold
strong egalitarian views for spreading the burdens as evenly as possible;
many are concerned about criteria that justify unequal distributions,
especially contribution to the waste problem and ecological
vulnerability; and still others are individualistic in their support of
market mechanisms for allocating the burden. Given this plurality of
values regarding fair siting procedures and outcomes, it is striking that
nearly everybody values the notion of responsibility. Taking direct
responsibility for waste disposal, whether by the individual, the firm or
the country producing the wastes, appears to be generally appealing,
although arguably for different reasons. The individualist, in theory,
would support the notion of individual responsibility and liability, as
would the egalitarians in their insistence on allocating the burdens to
producers. Hierarchists would also find the notion appealing to the
extent that this responsibility is managed by the established institutions.
The importance of the notion of responsibility for a region or
country to deal with its own wastes is supported by the results of a
survey carried out in Switzerland, which showed that outright
compensation is unacceptable to a large number of people because it
distracts from the motivation of accepting the facility as a social duty
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or responsibility.4 0 The significance of responsibility as a motivating
factor is also apparent in another context - the strong opposition to
exporting hazardous wastes to facilities in poor countries, where many
feel that countries have the responsibility to deal with their own wastes
in spite of economic arguments that this practice can benefit the
importing country.
Concluding Remarks
People appear to hold conflicting views about fair process and
outcome with respect to allocating the burdens of hazardous facility
sites. Voluntary siting approaches that give the right of consent to the
prospective host communities, enabling them to bargain a
compensatory package, appear to many as a way out of what they view
as a NIMBY problem and thus as a fair solution to the siting impasse.
However, the NIMBY syndrome, based on an individualistic notion of
balancing risks and benefits, is an incomplete characterization of the full
range of personal motivations and commitments to a siting process and
outcome. Other motivating factors are rooted in hierarchical ideals of
sacrificing community rights for the overall harmony of society, as well
as egalitarian ideals of exempting the poor and disadvantaged from the
siting burden.
If a workable and generally accepted siting strategy for hazardous
facilities is indeed possible, it will need to grant legitimacy to the
different ideas of what is fair. Such a strategy must be tailored to the
prevailing political culture, or the relative strengths and patterns of
competing ideals, of the country involved. The hierarchial, expert
dominated process that eventually led to the acceptance of a hazardous
waste facility at Enzersdorf in Austria (but not Blumau), will certainly
not be appropriate in the U.S. with its anti-hierarchical traditions.
However, any approach based on only one concept of fairness will likely
encounter strong opposition in any country.
Reconciling contradictory values about fairness in sharing social
burdens is by no means impossible as experience in allocating other
types of social burdens shows. What is crucially important in siting
hazardous facilities is the identification of values that are held by most
40 Frey et al., supra note 4.
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or all of the contending parties to the debate, and in this way to
construct robust siting strategies. The Austrian questionnaire suggests
that the concept of responsibility may be one such motivating value
held by all the contenders in a siting debate. We have argued that only
by granting legitimacy to these different notions of fairness, and by
building on common values such as responsibility, will it be possible to
design siting procedures that promote social cohesion, trust and a sense
of fair play.
